Motivation
1991. The Cadbury Committe was created in order to address concern about standards ofnancial reporting and accountability, heightened by BCCI, Maxwell and the controversy over directors' pay.
1992. The Committe publishes a report, suggesting some recomendations. At the heart of the Committee's recommendations is a Code of Best Practice designed to achieve the necessary high standards of corporate behaviour.
"Comply or explain approach": Companies are required to state whether they are complying with the Code and to give a narrative reason for any areas of non-compliance and is part of the listing agreement with the stock exchange. " We believe that our approach, based on compliance with a voluntary code coupled with disclosure, will prove more e ective than a statutory code. It is directed at establishing best practice, at encouraging pressure from shareholders to hasten its widespread adoption, and at allowing some exibility in imple- There are auditor reports which in a limited way look at explanations. Grant Thornton-Corporate Governance Review (2003 Review ( , 2004 ; Deloitte-Directors' Remuneration Report (2004) We are the rst ones to study the e ectiveness of a corporate governance system viz. the "comply or explain" approach using UK data. 
Quality of explanation
We rank explanations from the least informative to the most detailed.
No explanation (Type 0): lack of justi cations
General ( Transitional (Type 4): transitional circumstances (IPOs, mergers, sudden resignations, etc.)
{ With e ect from next year, the Company will be compliant with the Provision.
Genuine (Type 5): speci c to the company's circumstances { The company remains the only independently owned and quoted music major in the world and has been the subject of takeover speculation for many years. To be able to compete for talent, it has, therefore been necessary to provide an additional degree of protection for executive directors. More pressure to comply on companies when bad explanations are given.
Yearwise quality

Analysis
The code encourages Companies to comply. Good! Non-compliant companies however do not give satisfactory explanations. The spirit of the Code is not fully embraced. Bad!
The problem of non-compliances and bad explanations is ampli ed in companies where agency con icts are likely to be higher viz. Family Firms, non FTSE 100, non Cross-Listed companies. Precisely the kind of places where we would want stronger governance. Very Bad! The response has been to limit the discretion available to companies in interpreting the provisions, with not much attention paid to the explanations provided. This has resulted in a movement away from the principles based to a more box ticking approach.
